Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War Robert Strassler, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1996).
Thucydides, an exiled Athenian Strategos, describes the war between Sparta and Athens. Intended as “a possession for all time,” this monumental work is the first significant military history, one that set a demanding standard for all subsequent historians to achieve, but one that has met—and likely exceeded—the authors’ expectations (1.22.4). Throughout, Thucydides demonstrates how war, policies, attitudes, and discourse change as the war continued to grind away at the Greek world. Thucydides’ work remains incredibly relevant today because of its clear reflections on the nature of power and humankind.
Thucydides writes about the nature of war. He states very clearly that war is often the result of three things, “fear, honor, and interest” (1.76.2). Within that trinity, he places Spartan fear of Athenian power as the root cause of hostilities erupting between the two great powers of Classical Greece (1.23.6). Like so many major wars, however, it began with combat in an imperial backwater, in this case, the Athenian defense of Corcyra, a minor naval power situated on the trade route to Sicily. This decision ended the Thirty Years Peace as Corinth clamored for Lacedemonian support, and Athens likewise prepared for war. Thucydides shines in his re-creation of influential speeches, particularly in the lead-up to the conflict. What took place was a monumental conflict between one power dominant in land warfare and another a great sea power.
Pericles’ initial Athenian strategy was to avoid a decisive land engagement, use the defenses of the city and port to protect its citizens, maintain open sea lanes, and raid Spartan areas when the opportunity presented itself. The strategic goal was to convince Sparta that the war was untenable and victory was impossible. It was a strategy of exhaustion, though it was Athens that was eventually exhausted after their ill-fated Sicilian expedition seventeen years into the conflict. The strategy was sound but did not account for the Spartan ability to continue the war, which they did, for more than a decade. Because of its naval focus, the strategy was also expensive, and according to Donald Kagan’s work, the Athenians only had enough funds to carry it out for three years.[1]
As the war dragged on, many of Athens’ tribute allies revolted, and Sparta took advantage, waging ancient forms of hybrid warfare with leaders like Brasidas serving as a proto-Green Beret. Nevertheless, Athens’ superior economic weight allowed it to weather many setbacks, and on multiple occasions, they had opportunities to sue for peace on favorable terms, such as after Pylos in 424 and Matinea in 418. Thucydides’ detailed treatment of the Sicilian expedition and the Melian dialogue provide lessons in statecraft and diplomacy while highlighting the role economics, geography, hubris, and even superstition play in the strategic decision-making process. Potential peace treaties inevitably deteriorated. It took, finally, economic support from a major world power—Persia—to fund a large Spartan navy so they could defeat the Athenians’ primary force once and for all. Like so many wars, it took one faction learning to meet the other on its domain to finally achieve victory. The devastation of war left Athens weak and isolated, and Sparta was reliant on Persia financially so that in the end, the only real winner of the Peloponnesian War was Persia.
Thucydides documents the war, primarily by traveling throughout the Hellenic world interviewing participants. Thucydides was a wealthy Athenian general who participated in the conflict firsthand. After failing to protect Amphipolis in the winter of 424-23 BCE, he spent the rest of the war in exile, traveling, interviewing participants on either side and writing a history for all time. Because politics and war in Ancient Greece were essentially inseparable, the speeches Thucydides recreates within are vital. They shed light on attitudes, culture, and the strategic decision-making process of the time. He also writes in exceptional detail, down to the tactical level. This detail gives readers an impressive array of material that highlights the fog and friction of the battlefield, the unpredictability of warfare, and the role of disease and natural disaster on war’s outcomes.
Robert Strassler’s The Landmark Thucydides is a valuable resource for any student of this war. It helps the reader understand the Greek world, providing contextual information through detailed footnotes, marginalia, appendices, and maps. The appendices are essential for defining terms and describing Hellenic political and military structures. Any edition of Thucydides’ history is remarkable and should be read by all students of war, strategy, security studies, and the like. As the so-called founder of the “realist” school of international relations, many of Thucydides’ conclusions ought to be taken as a warning. As the Spartan King Archidamus warns, “the freaks of chance [in war] are not determinable by calculation.”
[1] Donald Kagan, “Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, Wars, and States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 39.