T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2008)
The preeminent narrative history of the Korean War, T.R. Fehrenbach’s This Kind of War details the United States’ involvement in the Korean peninsula from the end of World War II through the inconclusive cease-fire of 1953. Initially published in 1963, just ten years after the end of hostilities, this book serves as a near-contemporary history and one filled with personal reflection. A journalist and veteran of the war rather than a trained historian, Fehrenbach makes no mention of himself in the book, but it is clear that his experience as a leader at multiple echelons during the war informs his analysis. Rather than make this a memoir, Fehrenbach writes what is “very much a platoon leader’s book,” to describe what happened during the war, and how it came to be. (p. xii)
Fehrenbach’s tone throughout is one of bitter disillusionment, concluding with the statement that, “The lesson of Korea is that it happened.” (p. 456) Despite this morose report, Fehrenbach outlines many lessons for the United Nations forces and the Communist bloc. The Korean War, according to Fehrenbach, was entirely different from previous American conflicts and a precursor of things to come. For the first time, the United States went to war to preserve the balance of power overseas, rather than to combat an existential threat. To the author, the Korean War was a war of wills rather than one contested by pure military power. The communist powers knew that when North Korean tanks rumbled south, they were provoking a response likely short of nuclear war. For South Korea and the west, engaging in limited warfare was the only feasible solution outside of surrender as escalation to atomic weapons was out of the question. Nevertheless, after more than 37,000 Americans were killed in action, the United States realized that limited wars in the Atomic age would become the norm. The author concludes, rather ominously, that the United States would face more, similar, limited wars against communist adversaries around the globe.
Of the many lessons gleaned from the war, perhaps most important is that of limited warfare. The United States, the author argues, learned it could not destroy communism, nor use atomic weapons, without risking its destruction in the form of nuclear holocaust. He offers that to fight limited wars on the “imperial frontier,” as in Korea, a nation requires a professional military vastly different from American citizen-soldier tradition. Fehrenbach derives this from the US Army’s initial unpreparedness in Korea and the historical examples of Roman and British imperial armies. He shows that the US Army’s most significant weakness at the outset of the war was its citizen army, fattened by inactivity and manned by those who “wore the uniform but were civilians at heart.” (p. 60) Further, in an atomic age infatuated with long-range nuclear bombers and intercontinental missiles, the author asserts that this war demonstrated the need to maintain a strong ground force to act as a frontier constabulary. If the United States were to police the world, as Fehrenbach says, it would still need policemen.
The author’s lack of formal historical training is apparent in his lack of notes or a bibliography. Fortunately, he reveals his sources in the acknowledgments, reporting on his use of “official records, operations journals, histories, memoirs, and newspapers.” (p. xii) Regardless, the combination of small unit leader’s histories and Fehrenbach’s journalistic prose make this a riveting and accessible read. Of note are his uses of timely humor to drive home particularly powerful criticisms of the war and its lessons. Fehrenbach’s ability to weave the tactical level personal narrative with the operational picture and strategic situation make this an essential book for understanding the depth of the war. It is organized into three chronological sections tackling the road to war, its initial year, and the final two years, respectively. He concludes with a final chapter analyzing the war’s lessons and offering relevant suggestions for future military leaders to ponder.
Originally subtitled “A Lesson in Unpreparedness,” Fehrenbach’s scathing review of the American infantryman’s preparedness and the failure of the citizen-soldier demonstrate the reality of such a force in the Atomic Age. The advent of the All-Volunteer Force and subsequent widening of the civilian-military divide through nearly two decades of persistent conflict has come close to achieving Fehrenbach’s vision of a professional American legionary force, but at a cost. While its lack of sources makes this book problematic for scholars, this feature makes it very accessible for the layman and military professional. Already gracing the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Professional Development Reading List, anyone involved with the Korean peninsula should read this book, and especially personnel creating readiness policy to understand the grave consequences of unpreparedness.