S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947)
Biography: Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (1900-1977) served in the U.S. Army during WWI and as a reporter during the interwar period. He came back into the Army of the United States to serve as combat historian in both the Pacific and European Theaters during WWII and conducted numerous conflict studies across the world until his death. He claims to have received a battlefield commission in WWI, but that has since been debunked.
Overview: This book was written immediately following World War II based on his copious interviews and After Action Reports of combat in the ETO and Central Pacific where he served as an official army historian. Most of the interviews were conducted shortly after battle. Throughout the book Marshall attempts to highlight the difficulty of being a grunt, especially in opposition to national importance put on technology. The book’s chapters appeared as articles in Infantry Journal beginning in 1947. The fire ratio thesis has been disproven, but his overall point about training shortfalls and the necessity of cohesion is very much still valid. Furthermore, this book directly influenced training for Korea and Vietnam.
Central Thesis: Marshall sets out to identify training shortfalls to better prepare men for future combat. To do so his argument rests on two central theses. The ratio of fire and primary group cohesion.
Scope of Book:
- Marshall argues that war is inherently human, and the individual soldier is what decides victory. In the course of that war (WWII) we learned anew that man is supreme, that it is the soldier who fights who wins battles, that fighting means using a weapon, and that it is the heart of man which controls this use.” (p.23)
- Marshall finds that at best, 25% of men fired their weapons in WWII, but on average the number is closer to 15%. He attributes this to a “fear of aggression” instilled by polite society in the United States.
- Marshal believed that US training remained inadequate to prepare soldiers and especially junior officers for combat leadership. He recommended focusing training on realistic combat training scenarios, especially in the light of the individual nature of the battlefield, largely devoid of actual contact with the enemy. Training to the nature of man.
- He believes that what kept a soldier moving forward was the near or presumed presence of a comrade. He argues that soldiers must have a feeling of spiritual unity to be efficient and that this is the basic psychological principle of the infantryman. The infantryman is sustained by his comrades first, and his weapons secondarily.
- Emphasizes the importance of communication, speech, on a person-person level to give infantrymen the sense of comradeship around them in addition to higher levels of situational awareness. Person to person communications build the fighting spirit.
- He also believes that discipline and morale are mutually supporting. Insofar as good leadership instills discipline not through fear or being overly tough, but rather through understanding their men.
- Also argues for the importance of fire superiority and the psychological effect it has on the enemy or our own men. In the heat of combat, it is difficult to ascertain just how large an enemy unit might be, and offers examples of small American forces turning back larger German advances simply because they assumed they were running into a larger element. This also demonstrates the reality that in combat one rarely sees the enemy, which also contributes to his ratio of fire thesis. Fire is the key to mobility
- Ratio of fire statistics are unimportant, as what Marshall is trying to do is foster better training. Men fight for their primary group. Fighting for ones primary group means firing your weapon and higher firing rates, so training must not only emphasize firing, but also building primary group cohesion through tough realistic training.
Commentary: Very quick and easy read that offers an clear insight into tactical level warfare. In spite of the controversy surrounding Marshall’s fire ratios, the value of his work in portraying the fundamentals and experiences of men in combat is the key take away. His desire to train Americans more effectively for future conflict were implemented in the U.S. Army. The intro to the 2000 edition is particularly helpful, as are the first two and final two chapters.