Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990)
Often shrouded in myths of inherent German superiority, the breakthrough at Sedan was a complex and contingent battle between two modern armies. In The Breaking Point, Robert A. Doughty demonstrates that the outcome was far from inevitable and turned on the actions of cohesive infantry units more than on technology and speed. Doughty is a retired brigadier general and decorated Vietnam veteran who earned a Ph.D. from Kansas in 1979. He served as the chair of the history department at West Point from 1985 until his retirement in 2005. He is the author of multiple books and received the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize for lifetime achievement from the Society for Military History in 2006.
This book is a classic operational history of one corps’ fight during one campaign analyzing the contrasting organization, leadership, and doctrine of the French and German armies. Doughty’s primary purpose in this book is to dispel the many myths that emerged from Germany’s victory over France in 1940. Doughty is adamant that the fundamental difference between the two belligerents was not equipment or manpower but doctrine and execution—how they fought. According to Doughty, Germany was better trained, better led, and followed more viable tactical and operational doctrine than the French. As Doughty writes about extensively in other works such as The Seeds of Disaster (1985), the French prepared for a methodical battle predicated on the primacy of the commander, the destructiveness of firepower, and the strength of the defense.[1] The Germans, on the other hand, prepared for and waged mobile war predicated on empowered subordinates making battlefield decisions.
The first myth Doughty wishes to dispel is the notion of blitzkrieg. The concept of “Blitzkrieg” was not a codified doctrine, but rather a later invention of the Allied press to describe the rapid string of German victories. Rather than being an unstoppable force, there was a great deal of bad luck on the Allied side that made collapse possible. Second, the author dispels the notion of armor dominance in the battle, providing ample evidence of German infantrymen and engineers carrying the day at Sedan—it was the 1st infantry Regiment that secured the initial crossing of the Meuse. A third myth revolves around the supposed superiority of Nazi equipment. Doughty demonstrates that the Germans did not have superior equipment—much of the French equipment was in fact superior in design—only that the Germans employed theirs better. A final myth dispelled by Doughty is the importance of the German dive bomber. Doughty shows that the Stuka’s howling noise was more useful as a psychological and emotional tool than the airplane was as a weapon of war.
Equal parts narrative and analysis, the book covers the German breakthrough over the Meuse and the start of the race to the English Channel culminating in France’s defeat in 1940. Doughty focuses on the execution of the campaign by General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps and its subordinate units. He alternates between treatments of German attacks and French reaction to those attacks. The book runs chronologically through the Corps’ approach march through the Ardennes, its crossing of the Meuse at Sedan, and its destruction of disparate French units as the corps established a bridgehead and consequently broke out on their way to the Channel—encircling the Allied forces that had pushed deep into Belgium expecting Germany to repeat their 1914 offensive. The Germans won because they prepared for mobile warfare by teaching their commanders to operate within their intent and make decisions from the front as circumstances changed. Auftragstaktik exists in stark contrast to a French army paralyzed by indecision and well prepared for a methodical battle that did not materialize. Taking a multi-archival approach that relies on French and German sources, Doughty expertly reconstructs the Battle of Sedan and subsequent breakout from both angles. He painstakingly recreates the moments of the battle that play a critical role in deciding its outcome. The book suffers from some typographical errors and, at times, dry language. Nevertheless, this work is ideal for anyone interested in diving deep into the operations and tactics concerning the Battle of Sedan. It is a work published for a lay audience, or at least the military history buff. However, Doughty’s conclusions and examination of military cultures within the French and German armies—particularly how their respective armies produced doctrinal concepts and standard operating procedures that played a prominent role in deciding this battle–make this a scholarly work for a broad audience. Because of its approach, this work is required reading for anyone wishing to understand the contingent nature of conflict—not only in 1940 but across time and space.
[1] Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985)