Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985)
Biography: Robert A. Doughty is a retired Brigadier General and decorated Vietnam veteran who earned his PhD from Kansas in 1979. He served as the head of the department of history at USMA from 1985 until his retirement in 2005. He is the author of multiple books and the recipient of many awards including the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize from SMH for lifetime service in 2006. This book won the 1986 Paul Birdsall Prize in European Military and Strategic History from the American Historical Association.
Thesis: Doughty finds that though France had devoted more than two decades to preparing for war with Germany, they prepared for the wrong type of war. France prepared to fight carefully controlled and methodical battles that the Wehrmacht intended to avoid.
Scope of Book: Doughty seeks to provide at least a partial answer for why French forces failed so disastrously against the German blitzkrieg. To do so he explores doctrine, organization, institutions, and other developments during the interwar period. Doctrine development is the story here, and he defines doctrine as “the best available thought on what would usually work best on the battlefield.” (p. x) Doctrine thus provides the basis for organizing, equipping, training, and employing military forces. Doughty then describes how the French developed this doctrine by detailing all of its historical and cultural antecedents. This book set the standard for works on the fall of France in 1940. It also reflected contemporary intellectual currents in the US Army after Vietnam.
The Framework of French Doctrine (Chapter 1): In order to fight bataille conduit, or “methodical battle,” the French Army formulated a doctrine, organized and equipped its army, and trained tit for the wrong type of war. This doctrines framework frame from an emphasis on the destructiveness of firepower, the strength of the defense, the ascendancy of methodical battle, and the unifying power of the commander. It was very centralized and demanded strict obedience through a step by step battle sequence. They were not ready in 1939 to refight World War I, it must be noted, they were ready to fight a war very similar to the western front in 1918. Doctrine became mandatory formula during this time rather than a guide.
An Army of Reservists (Chapter 2): One contributing factor to the French system of defense was its reliance on the citizen-soldier and their supposed élan over a smaller, more professional force. They believed in the aroused nation in arms and thus constructed their organizations, equipment, and doctrine to best utilize this concept thus making their doctrine less flexible and more rigid.
The Defense of the Frontiers (Chapter 3): France’s frontiers, such as the border regions near Germany and Belgium contained the overwhelming majority of its natural resources. (75% of coal was vulnerable to a minor German penetration while 83% of iron ore came from Lorraine). Furthermore, 1 out of every 7 Frenchmen lived in Paris, a mere 125 miles from Sedan. This led to French leaders visualizing a need to defend these regions with the Maginot line while creating motorized infantry and artillery units to move forward quickly rather than armored forces.
The Legacy of the Past (Chapter 4): After 1918 French leaders that they had focused too much on winning decisively in 1914 and eschewed preparations for a long war. Statistical data and personal experience showed that the war demonstrated the safety and strength of the defense and the French were convinced that increases in firepower had greatly altered conduct on the battlefield.
Firepower and the Methodical Battle (Chapter 5): Firepower, to the French, became the “preponderant factor of combat,” and that fire “destroys the enemy or neutralizes him.” In French military thinking, firepower allowed the maneuver of infantry and all machines of war were considered auxiliaries to the infantryman. Massive firepower and infantry maneuver in a highly controlled manner the French prepared for set-piece methodical attack and not the sort of hastily assembled long armor attacks supported by aircraft that the Germans used.
Institutions and Doctrine (Chapter 6): France also suffered significant problems in the organization of its institutions. They had no smooth system for analyzing issues and resolving problems. Instead, the French high command relied on overly bureaucratic committees that functioned in an often spasmodic fashion. Thus, the military found it easier to maintain old concepts than adopt new ones. The cumbersome military hierarchy was neither innovative nor flexible and therefore their ability to adapt to German tactics was hamstrung from the beginning.
The Development of the Tank (Chapter 7): In developing tank doctrine, the French were unable to perceive an independent mission for the tank because of its experience in the First World War as well as their reluctance to let tanks and armored personnel overrun their doctrine. The overreliance on firepower and infantry led to inadequate tanks and the inability to conceive of independent tank divisions. This was born from its experience in World War I and manifested in heavy and light roles for tanks. For the French the tank had “to be bound tightly to the infantry and to be restrained by the tether of artillery support.” (p. 166)
The Creation of Large Armored Units (Chapter 8): As mentioned above, the army’s leaders were reluctant to strip tanks from their infantry support role as the infantry—especially in a large citizen army—was the most important branch in their eyes. As such the French did not create any large armored force outside of a light mechanized division and a light cavalry division. France’s movement toward mechanization, therefore, was characterized by its differing ideas. The ideal tank was deemed impossible and so a tank was developed for the infantry, for the cavalry, and a medium tank by armored officers. Nevertheless, none were able to fulfil the idea of a perfect tank and therefore the French were uncomfortable creating large armored forces.
Conclusions (Chapter 9): Doughty finds that the French were never able to apply their doctrine in 1940 because it was inapplicable to modern warfare, especially facing a Wehrmacht using mobile warfare tactics explicitly designed to avoid what the French were planning for. He notes that the French were not trying to refight World War I and their doctrine did change, just to a more advanced version of what happened in 1918. He finds that the failure to change is rooted in the political, institutional, historical, and strategic relationships that induced the French to mold and adapt the new weaponry to the prevailing doctrine. (p.189) Ultimately, according to Doughty, France was a victim of herself as her leaders chose to rely on an inadequate tactical doctrine and to follow a weak and vulnerable strategy.
Commentary: A quick read that presents some interesting lessons in planning for future war to any historian. His conclusions about what would have happened seem a bit of a stretch and ignores the role of contingency and the fact that “the enemy gets a vote.”