Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999)
Peter Mansoor’s The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 demonstrates the evolution of U.S. infantry divisions into combat effective organizations despite a myriad of obstacles. Conceived initially as his doctoral dissertation at The Ohio State University, Mansoor’s expertise as a combat arms commander lends authenticity to the subject as he analyzes effectiveness and applies that analysis to the Army of the United States in World War II. Published on the 55th anniversary of D-Day, this book earned awards from the Society for Military History and the Army Historical Society in 2000. Following a long career in the United States Army, Dr. Mansoor is now teaching and researching at his graduate alma mater where he holds the General Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair in Military History.
Mansoor argues that despite a less than perfect mobilization, training, and replacement processes, the Army of the United States created combat effective divisions that were decisive to the defeat of the German and Italian armies. In order to support this thesis, he provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating combat effectiveness, which he defines as “the ability of a military organization to achieve its assigned mission with the least expenditure of resources in the shortest amount of time.” (p. 3) Mansoor further explores combat effectiveness through four groups of factors: human, organizational, technical, and endurance. Within each group is a myriad of smaller factors that, when analyzed comprehensively, allow the author to deduce that the strength of the Army of the United States “lay in its ability to adapt to changing conditions.” (p. 4) According to Mansoor, the jagged path but ultimate success of the American combat infantry division in Europe was the natural outgrowth of a deliberate, albeit imperfect, process of democratic societies turning citizens into soldiers.
Applying this analytical framework to his study of American infantry division performance in the Mediterranean and European theater of operations, Mansoor concludes that American infantry divisions were, by and large, competent organizations that made up for deficiencies in training and manpower through their adaptability and evolution over the course of the war. The most combat effective divisions, he concludes, had good leadership at the division level; enough combat experience to season troops and leaders but not so much as to destroy unit cohesion; were critical of themselves as digested through lessons learned; emphasized the formation of unit pride; and integrated replacements well. Mansoor concludes definitively that the Army of the United States succeeded in World War II because it could create combat-effective divisions that fought and won battles but also sustained themselves, often over years of combat operations.
Sources for this book are not a problem; as Mansoor himself states, “no war in history has been better recorded than World War II.” (p. 317) Nevertheless, his reading and analysis of source material provide a fresh look at infantry training and combat during that period. Rooted in primary source documents found at the significant military archives in the United States, Mansoor brings the story of the American infantry division’s development to life. By combining such sources as official unit histories, memoirs, personal papers, and field reports and the myriad of official Army self-studies, he puts together a comprehensive analysis of what makes a unit effective, and whether or not American infantry divisions met that definition.
Immensely readable, Mansoor organizes the book chronologically, taking the reader on a journey from mobilization to victory. The first portion of the book is dedicated to the problems of mobilizing and training as the United States turned citizens into soldiers. The remainder of the book takes the reader from the first battles in North Africa, through the Italian campaign, and into Normandy as the Allies moved to the final campaign of the war in Europe. The final chapter provides a succinct conclusion in the form of an analysis of combat effectiveness using the model outlined in the introduction.
Mansoor provides an excellent framework for historians to analyze combat effectiveness, especially the addition of his use of endurance as evaluation criteria. Mansoor also challenges widely held notions of Wehrmacht superiority and American inferiority. Historians have not often evaluated performance with as comprehensive an analysis as Mansoor provides. Suitable for academics requiring a comprehensive history of infantry operations in the European Theater of Operations, this work is ideal for military commanders at all echelons to study what makes an organization effective in combat.