Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2017)
Biography: Nadia Schadlow is a National Security Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. She is the author of multiple articles and chapters in several edited volumes. She earned her PhD at Johns Hopkins University in the SAIS and worked on the National Security Council with HR McMaster including as his deputy. While there, was the primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy.
Overview: A review of American attempts at governance operations both past and present. Some success, mainly failure and the reasons for such.
Central Thesis: From the Mexican War until today, the United States has been reluctant to consolidate gains and reconstitute political order during and after combat. “US military and political leaders have consistently failed to devote appropriate attention and resources to organizing for the political requirements of military interventions.” (2) This has resulted in a denial syndrome that precludes effective war planning and perpetuates unpreparedness for this aspect of war.
Scope of Book: The book consists of five chapters. She offers three common themes throughout:
- Political factors and objectives shaped each war
- The Army faced the challenge of developing an organization to conduct governance in theater
- Following the creation of an organization within the theater, the army undertook specific tasks to restore political and economic stability in order to leave behind institutions compatible with US interests.
- Chapter one frames the book by describing the concept of governance operations and the Army as the critical operational between a militarily defeated regime and a functioning one compatible with US interests. She also defines American denial syndrome and offer four themes that shape it.
- Discomfort with the idea of military led political activities
- Concerns about colonialism
- The view that civilians should take the lead in governance operations
- And traditional views about war and the military profession.
- Chapter Two outlines the Army’s early experiences with governance operations in Mexico, California, and New Mexico following the Mexican War. The South following the Civil War. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines following the Spanish-American War, and the Rhineland following World War I. She argues that military personnel proved capable of adapting to whatever challenges they faced in establishing a political order.
- Chapter Three focuses on World War II and efforts in Korea, Japan, Italy, and Germany. She demonstrates that this period saw the creation of a more institutionalized structure for governance, including a school for military government in Charlottesville, VA. Regardless, this task remained outside the Army’s core responsibilities and as such was all but discarded by the regular army after the war.
- Chapter Four describes operations during the Cold War in Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. She describes how these sorts of operations were institutionalized in the reserve component and special operations through the creation of Civil Affairs units.
- Chapter Five looks at recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The last chapter, Conclusions offers ideas for policy and institutions to better conduct operations in the future. In another useful list she offers five recommendations (273-278):
- American policymakers must accept that the political dimension is indispensable across the full spectrum of war
- US must realize that unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success
- Although civilians formulate and drive policy, they must give the army operational control over governance operations in war.
- American leaders must not be seduced by the idea that they can achieve policy objectives from afar by kinetic means alone.
- The US must have some standing capabilities and organizations that are prepared to conduct key governance tasks.
- “Because the cause of conflict most often entails political competitions for power, resources, and survival, accomplishing wartime goals requires the consolidation of military gains politically.” (280)
Commentary: An excellent, well researched, logical argument. And while her case-studies are solid she leaves some out, namely frontier management in the post-Civil War era. Regardless, this is an excellent read and a must for anyone writing about consolidating gains.