Review of Max Boot, Invisible Armies

Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013)

Biography: Max Boot is a former editor at the WSJ, Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and current columnist for the Washington Post and the author of several books.

Overview: A one-stop overview of guerrilla war through 64 different case studies in which Boot draws out the main trends of counterinsurgency warfare.

Central Thesis: Guerrilla and terrorist tactics are as old as recorded history. This book shows low-intentsity conflict from its origins in the prehistoric world to contemporary conflicts.

Scope of Book: The book covers warfare from pre-Roman to Afghanistan. It is wide ranging but not an encyclopedia. Boot does offer five major points that persist in low-intensity conflict as well as twelve lessons.

Five points (pp xxvi–xxvii):

1. Low intensity conflict is ubiquitous in history and vitally important to shaping the world.
2. Political organizing and propaganda have been rising in importance as factors in low-intensity warfare over the past two centuries.
3. Guerrillas and terrorists have become more successful since 1945 in large part because of their ability to play on publica opinion.
4. Outside assistance has been one of the most important factors in the success of insurgent campaigns.
5. Population-centric counterinsurgency has been an essential ppart of most successful counterguerrilla campaigns.

Twelve lessons (pp557–567):

1. Guerrila warfare has been ubuiquitous and important throughout history
2. Guerrilla wawrfare is not an eastern way of war—it is the universal war of the weak.
3. It is both underestimated and overestimated.
4. Insurgencies have been getting more successful since 1945 but still lose most of the time.
5. The most important development in guerrilla warfare has been the rise of public opinion.
6. Coventional tactics don’t work against an unconventional threat.
7. Few counterinsurgents have ever succeeded by inflicting mass terror
8. Population-centric counterinsurgency is often successful but not as touchy-feely as commonly supposed.
9. Establishing legitimacy is vital for each side—difficult for foreign entity.
10. Most insurgencies are long-lasting; attemps to win a quick victory backfire.
11. Guerrillas are most effective when able t operate with outside support—especially conventional units.
12. Technology has been less important in guerrilla war than in conventional war.

Commentary: Large summary of counterinsurgency case-studies that will be an good reference for answer questions about COIN. Excellent reference for anyone interested in insurgency and counterinsurgency over the long duree of history.