James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992)
Author: James Corum is an air power historian and has taught at the Command and General Staff College as well as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB. He is currently a lecturer at the University of Salford. He dean of the Baltic Defence College in Estonia from 2009 to 2014.
Synopsis: This book describes how Germany rebuilt itself following World War I, despite the rigidity imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Corum describes the development of German doctrine during the interwar period, concentrating on the period in which Hans on Seeckt was chief of the General Staff and then army commander from 1919 to 1926. Hans van Seeckt was an original military thinker who brought a clear vision and comprehensive view of future warfare and was therefore one of the most important military thinkers of the twentieth century. Throughout this book Corum describes the planning and thinking that went into making maneuver combined arms warfare possible well before the equipment existed. Corum depicts a military culture in which junior officers could oppose, in print and repeatedly, the firm convictions of their elders and yet not suffer retaliation. In short, an invaluable study of how a peacetime military avoided stagnation at a time of technological flux and when its relevance to immediate international problems appeared minimal. From the beginning the Reichswehr was groomed for offensive, and not defensive purposes. He argues that the dramatic German victory in 1940 can be found in two factors: superior tactics and superior training (203)
Central Argument: The seeds of blitzkrieg were sewn in the early period just after World War I because the Germans digested the lessons of World War I and incubated their ideas in a culture of dissent and discussion.
Historiography: Most works on this period involve the German army’s political involvement and neglect the culture within the army and their attempts at change. Corum also debunks the idea that Guderian is the father of armored warfare, all but proclaiming this title on von Seeckt. His core source is Army Regulation 487 and he uses it well to give a comprehensive picture of Reichswehr tactical doctrine during the interwar period or how they arrived at this doctrine. Something missing before this book. He also challenges Citino’s idea that the German Army developed blitzkrieg solely in response to the Polish threat.
Commentary: Quick and easy to read, an excellent treatment of both culture and interwar innovation. The epilogue deals with some comparison of British and French responses to World War I as well. This, however, is critical in the argument that the Germany army was the best tacticians on earth.