Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016)
Initially published in 1993, Conrad Crane’s revised 2016 edition, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil, focuses on the Army Air Force’s (AAF) quest during World War II to prove precision bombing capable of winning a war by itself while explicitly avoiding non-combatant casualties. Conrad Crane is an Army historian serving as Chief of Historical Services for the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, PA. A retired Army colonel, he earned his Ph.D. from Stanford University and was the lead author for the U.S. military’s 2006 counterinsurgency manual. American Airpower Strategy in World War II evolved from two research questions. Why do discussions about the atomic bomb focus on how to use it, and not whether to do so? Also, whether of not moral considerations and other limitations be effective in war near densely populated areas.
Crane’s primary argument is that, contrary to prevailing historical discourse, the AAF pursued precision bombing pursuant to a doctrine that favored military and industrial targets over terror bombing of cities. He focuses on the intent of American leaders and airmen to spare civilians. Collateral damage is an unfortunate side effect of war, but the American strategy made a concerted effort to spare non-combatants. Crane also demonstrates how doctrine and technology evolved toward more precise bombing throughout the war. Americans believed their equipment and doctrine would not only ensure minimal civilian casualties, but would also win the war quicker and with fewer ground casualties. As the war progressed, industrial workers became combatants in the minds of planners due to their influence on the war effort. As Crane asserts, the fire-bombing of Tokyo and the atomic bomb were natural outgrowths of this thought process.
Nevertheless, attitudes between the European and Pacific theaters were not the same. In Europe, where the AAF enjoyed a much more symbiotic relationship with the Allies and the rest of the U.S. Army thanks to Eisenhower’s unified command structure, airmen had a better grasp on their role within the big picture. In the Pacific, distance and a split command structure left the Twentieth Air Force nominally independent, reporting directly to General of the Army Hap Arnold in Washington. Because of its relative autonomy, the Twentieth Air Force felt pressure to prove the efficacy of precision bombing, and their ability to end the war from the air, which led to the holistic targeting of Japanese production capability, including its labor force.
Crane concludes that the precedent set by the AAF in World War II left a cultural legacy of precision targeting. Culminating in the modern US Air Force’s preoccupation with precision guided munitions and careful avoidance of civilian casualties, Crane traces the development of precision from World War II to recent conflicts. By connecting World War II strategies to modern warfare, Crane leaves the reader with a comprehensive history of American precision bombing doctrine.
Rather than focus solely on Pentagon policy, Crane works through day-to-day operational and planning documents to see how American commanders resisted outside pressure to conduct terror bombing. Operational records show American attempts to avoid non-combatant casualties and demonstrate that this was a fundamental tenet of U.S. airpower strategy throughout the war. Crane further analyzes doctrine, policy, personal papers, and oral history interviews to weave a narrative of the development and practice of restraint and continual efforts by American airmen to avoid civilian casualties in the decades since.
This book is very readable and organized thematically, beginning with doctrine development and an analysis of its effect on the war. The first portion of the book describes alternating attitudes about strategic bombing among the public, national leaders, and airmen, followed by two chapters detailing the development of the technology that would allow the Americans to meet their strategic goals. Crane then offers an in-depth analysis of the bombing campaigns in Europe, Germany, and Japan to show the effectiveness of U.S. strategies. The final two chapters include an examination of the use of strategic airpower in limited war followed by a consideration of the legacy that precision bombing in World War II left on the modern US Air Force.
Of particular interest is Crane’s excellent explanation of Operation X-Ray, the “bat bomb” project which had American scientists attempt to create swarms of bats with bombs. These bats would be as much a psychological weapon as a conventional one, stoking both panic and firestorms. Unsurprisingly, this idea did not come to fruition. The book is an excellent choice for anyone wishing to learn more about American attitudes toward and use of precision bombing in the Second World War and beyond. Perhaps best suited for military professionals, this work will serve anyone studying 20th Century U.S. military history well.