This is an adaptation of one of the first undergraduate papers I ever wrote, enjoy!
The Macedonian army exhibited a tactical brilliance that set a precedent in the employment of concentrated force. Their tactics represent the culmination of centuries of Greek warfare. Before the reforms of Philip, warfare in the region was two city-states pitting heavily armed phalanxes of citizen soldiers against each other in a head-on collision that offered little room for tactical agility, much less strategic maneuver. The Macedonians found unprecedented success by combining the strength of the Greek phalanx with the speed and agility of Macedonian cavalry. In so doing he merged two cultures while simultaneously laying the foundation for coordinating multiple combat arms to achieve decisive battlefield results against a superior force.
Many of the techniques and improvements Alexander employed came from his father.
Combined arms warfare is the coordinated use of multiple arms of combat to defeat the enemy. As defined in the 2017 edition of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–0 Operations, “Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially.”
While most of the ancient world employed multiple elements of combat power at one point or another, none of them synchronized their application like that of Alexander. Alexander’s army fought continuously throughout a twenty-two thousand mile march “without losing a single battle … while being outnumbered in almost every engagement.”
Alexander’s army consisted of multiple types of military units. In his study of Alexander’s use of combined arms warfare, Major Robert Pederson claims that Alexander employed ten different combat arms. All of Alexander’s combat arms were instrumental in securing his many victories, but in the interest of brevity, this paper will focus on the employment of infantry and cavalry in combination with each other by exploring his actions during two large engagements with a superior Persian force. To understand where this type of warfare came from, it will also study the development of the concept as well as the development of Alexander’s army. Finally, it will explore the legacy it left in large armies that emerged in the one-hundred and fifty or so years following the death of Alexander.
Infantrymen in the Macedonian army consisted of five different types: heavy infantry, hypaspists, light infantry, skirmish infantry and mounted-infantry. The heavy infantry was heavily armored and would fight in the phalanx with an 18-foot long pike called the sarissa. The hypaspist was less armored and more maneuverable; fighting in a formation between the cavalry and the heavy phalanx, and functioning as a joint between them. The light infantry was even less armored, usually wearing little more than helmet and shield, and fought with small pike and short sword and would often be employed as flank and rear security. Skirmishers would carry a variety of weapons, including javelins and fight independently in front of or along the flanks of the phalanx. The final infantry type employed by Alexander was the mounted-infantry, which saw introduction after defeating the Persians and fought on foot as heavy infantry but used horses for speed in movement, dismounting before battle. The harmonious integration of these five types of infantry with his other forces, especially the cavalry, was instrumental in winning victory for Alexander on multiple occasions.
Alexander employed both heavy and light cavalry forces. His heavy cavalry wore armor and fought with a spear identical to that of the heavy infantry and was used for direct fighting and shock style attack, usually from the flank or wing. Light cavalry, on the other hand, did not wear armor and used either a light javelin, a spear, or sometimes a bow. Light cavalry was best suited for reconnaissance, screening, and flank protection. The Macedonian ratio of cavalry to infantry was one cavalryman to six infantrymen at its peak. These multiple types of cavalrymen provided Alexander with an unmatched amount of flexibility and agility that allowed him to maneuver to match his enemy on the field of battle.
“Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially.” — US Army ADRP 3–0, 2017.
The primary method with which the Macedonians applied combined arms warfare is simple. The phalanx was placed in the center of the line, flanked by hypaspists that link the phalanx to cavalry contingents on the wings. Alexander himself was typically on the right wing with his companion cavalry, leading from the front. When fighting, the phalanx would fix the enemy’s primary force while the cavalry would fight on the wings to envelop the enemy. Hypaspists connected these two forces and prevented gaps from forming, such as the one which doomed Darius at Gaugamela. The aforementioned disposition of forces forms the basis for Alexander’s tactical decision making at Issus and Gaugamela. In both cases, the phalanx pinned the Persian center and allowed Alexander to lead the final envelopment maneuver from the right wing.
Alexander was not the first to combine these elements of combat power, and as such, any study of Alexander’s use of combined arms tactics cannot begin without a study of the Theban leader, Epaminondas and Alexander’s father, Philip. Before Epaminondas, warfare in Greece consisted mainly of hoplite phalanx versus hoplite phalanx battles. These battles were short, and casualties never higher than ten percent as combat was so formulaic that cavalry was not used in the pursuit of a fleeing enemy. The hoplite phalanx proved very successful for defending against a near-eastern force when the Greeks were able to repel the Persian invasions of 490 BC and 480–479 BC. This form of warfare served as the basis for what Philip and Alexander used to conquer Asia.
It is from Epaminondas that Philip learned many of the lessons he applied to the Macedonian army on the field of battle. While hostage in Thebes, Philip was able to observe the importance of close synchronization between the infantry and cavalry, and that meticulous planning and speed could ensure victory despite disadvantages in size and strength. Perhaps most importantly, Philip learned that the best method for decisively defeating the enemy was to attack its strength, not its weakness. Epaminondas used these principles to destroy Spartan hegemony in Greece, free Messinian Helots, and eradicate the myth of Spartan supremacy in battle at Leuctra and Mantinea in 371 BC and 362 BC, respectively. He defeated them in both battles by massing infantry on his left and leading a massive charge on the Spartan right. The Spartans did not recognize this and were routed by the Thebans twice in nine years. These battles serve to demonstrate the first significant adjustment in Greek battlefield tactics in 300 years.
To make use of the lessons, Philip would need to transform a Macedonian military system that was largely ineffective. Macedonia at the time of Philip’s ascension in 359 BC was a land of poor farmers who could not afford the equipment required to become hoplites in the traditional Greek sense. The Macedonian military was primarily composed of wealthy aristocratic cavalry with weak, lightly armed, infantry. Acknowledging these shortcomings, Philip used state money to equip and pay his forces while also bestowing the title of pezetairoi (foot companions) on these infantrymen. Through these reforms, Philip was able to elevate the significance and social standing of the infantry to the same level as cavalry. By treating them as companions and paying them, Philip was able to create a loyal fighting force. Furthermore, Philip made many improvements to the Greek infantry model. First, he equipped his soldiers with lighter armor and shields. Secondly, he formed them into a larger, less compact phalanx. Thirdly, and most important, was the development of the sarissa. The sarissa was a 16–18′ long pike that doubled the length of the standard Greek spear. In battle, the Macedonian phalanx would operate from a spread formation with the sarissas of the first four to five ranks pointing forward. Philip’s Macedonian phalanx was, therefore, stronger and more agile than previous Greek iterations of the phalanx and this would prove instrumental in Alexander’s conquest of Asia. Philip designed his army to use the phalanx as a base of maneuver for the cavalry to attack from the flank.
The battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC offers the first glimpse of Philip’s tactical brilliance with his army against a Greek opponent. The Macedonians faced a combined Theban-Athenian army that included the successors of his mentor Epaminondas. Philip’s tactical patience and agility were brilliant in this battle. His son, an 18-year-old Alexander, led the Macedonian companion cavalry from the left wing in the decisive maneuver. By using a pre-planned false retreat, Philip was able to draw the Athenians forward and create a gap in the Greek line. As the Athenian’s attempted pursuit of Philip’s forces, Alexander’s cavalry rode through that gap and attacked the Thebans from the rear. Philip had thus fixed his enemy with the weight of the massive new sarissa-phalanx, and Alexander exploited the opening by launching a critical flanking maneuver from the Macedonian left to win the day. With the combined Greek army destroyed, and the famed Theban Sacred Band slaughtered, Philip now controlled the entirety of Greece. Despite Philip’s assassination, Alexander continued the development of combined arms warfare and executed his father’s plans of invading Asia.
At the battle of Issus in 333 BC, Alexander fought his second encounter with the Persian army; this time outnumbered three to one. The battle took place in restricted, canalizing terrain that limited the ability of both commanders to maneuver their forces. Darius attempted to use his cavalry to outflank the Macedonians from the Persian right wing. In response, Alexander sent his Thessalian cavalry on the Macedonian left to oppose the Persian cavalry while he led his companion cavalry across the Pinarus River on the Macedonian right wing to outflank the Persian army. Darius had not expected such a maneuver, since, due to its steep banks, the river was thought to be too treacherous for horses to cross where Alexander did. While advancing into the Persian right, Alexander received word that his left wing was failing. Displaying his signature tactical agility, he prevented a catastrophe by ordering the hypaspists and phalanx that had joined him to wheel slightly left to reinforce his left side. Alexander’s decision making and coordinated infantry/cavalry assaults won the day, and the Macedonians forced Darius to turn and run, leaving his army in shambles.
In possibly the best display of Alexander’s brilliance as a military commander, he faced Darius and the Persians again on October 1st, 331 BC, at Gaugamela. Alexander once again defeated the Persian army despite being again outnumbered, this time by as many as five to one. Without the advantage of restrictive terrain, he formed a reserve line that was to move as one or detach troops to either flank, as the Persian’s maneuvering might dictate. As the battle began, Darius attempted to outflank the Greek right wing which led to a gap forming between his mercenary phalanx and his cavalry. Alexander, having already sent Thessalian cavalry to support the Macedonian left, drove his companion cavalry into this gap, posing an immediate threat to Darius, who fled.
Following the death of Alexander in 323 BC, his successors fought the Wars of the Diadochi to determine control of the vast empire which he had created. At first, they continued to employ the same tactics of Alexander, but warfare slowly devolved back to single arm combat. The Hellenistic commanders proved inflexible in adapting to changing situations and as such moved away from combined arms warfare. This is at least partly due to the enormous expense that maintaining cavalry requires. By using fewer cavalry, armies became less maneuverable, and this seems to have led to the infantry being divided further to enhance maneuverability and modularity. Smaller infantry units able to move independently help explain the development of the Roman maniple as a maneuver infantry superior to the Greek phalanx. The Macedonian’s were ahead of their time, and Alexander’s tactical brilliance and strategic flexibility were unsustainable without the right military mind coupled with the proper force composition.
Alexander’s art of war was briefly employed by King Pyrrhus, a descendant and student of Alexander’s, who was successful before ultimately succumbing to the manpower advantage the Romans enjoyed. He responded to the Greek settlers in southern Italy who asked for help in fighting off the Romans that were attempting to gain control of the Italian peninsula. Pyrrhus defeated the Romans in every battle by employing the same general combined arms tactics as Alexander but found his manpower quickly depleted. The Romans would eventually subjugate the Macedonians and according to Pederson, “It was a lack of manpower, rather than inferiority in military technique, which ultimately sealed Macedonia’s fate.”
The Romans did use multiple arms of combat but were not able to effectively coordinate their use like that of the Macedonians. As a result, the impetus of warfare returned to the infantryman. As the manipular legion developed, the individual infantryman would no longer stay bound by dense phalanx formations. The Roman army became the most effective formation in the ancient world due to its smaller, more maneuverable, and modular units of infantry. Additionally, the Roman manipular legion included some 300 cavalrymen, but the cavalry rarely fought in conjunction with the infantry. The Romans were victorious against a Macedonian phalanx in two significant battles in Macedon at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and again at Pydna in 168 BC. As the Romans penetrated the Macedonian phalanx, the Macedonians fell apart quickly and were soundly defeated. Roman success was primarily due to the tactical flexibility that the open formation allowed, but also due to the lack of ability on the part of Macedonian commanders as they could not match Alexander’s gifts for battlefield innovation and flexibility. The Romans were a very successful military force but did not achieve the same balance in combined arms action that Alexander was able to display with his Macedonian army. The success of the Roman military is attributable to the legionary infantryman, and not cavalry, nor its combination with cavalry.
“Alexander’s true genius was as a field-commander: perhaps, taken all in all, the most incomparable general the world has ever seen. His gift for speed, improvisation, variety of strategy; his cool-headedness in a crisis; his mastery of terrain; his psychological ability to penetrate the enemy’s intentions-all these qualities place him at the very head of the Great Captains of history.” — Peter Green in Alexander of Macedon, 356–323 B.C. : A Historical Biography
Alexander’s army was overwhelmingly successful and ahead of its time when it came to tactical organization and especially combined arms integration. Modern commanders can learn a great deal in the study of Alexander and his tactical genius. If the Greeks before Alexander displayed undisciplined corporatism, and the Romans displayed disciplined individualism, Alexander’s army was more akin to disciplined corporatism. The Macedonian way of war helped lay the foundation of western civilization, for it is through Alexander’s art of war that his empire founded more than 70 cities, which functioned as trading centers across Asia and were able to spread Hellenistic ideas and culture as far as China. After Rome defeated the Diadochi and controlled the Hellenistic world, Greek and Roman literature fused.
