A Dialectical Debate
Throughout the Second World War, most belligerents used some form of airborne operations to achieve effects on the battlefield. Costly trench warfare was a universal experience during World War I and fostered experimentations with paratroopers during the interwar period. In studying the Soviets interwar tests and early German operations, many American planners and theorists became enamored with the concept. It seemed to the United States as though the German invaders of Crete had “magically materialized out of the sky” and were the “epitome of vertical envelopment.” In Berlin, it had the opposite effect, and this costly operation ended German airborne operations for the duration of the war. While their operational employment was largely inefficient, their tactical prowess played an essential role in the liberation of Europe from the Nazi regime.
The original doctrine for U.S. paratroop forces was modest and called for their use in small, commando-style raids deep behind enemy lines that would likely be suicide missions, and heavy casualties were expected. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army quickly expanded from a few parachute battalions to five complete airborne divisions and with it an entire command structure. The airborne component of the June 6, 1944 D-Day landings maintain a legendary stature in the United States Army Airborne due to the tenacity of the paratroopers in securing a foothold for the invasion of mainland Europe in the face of heavy casualties. However, the question remains: Was the American use of paratroopers during Operation Overlord successful?
Many scholars believe that the use of paratroopers by the United States to shape conditions for success in Normandy, while far from perfect, was generally successful due to their ability to create confusion on the battlefield that disrupted decision-making by the German defenders and seize key terrain. However, others point to the high casualty rates, high scatter patterns, and an inability to complete missions on time to show that Operation Neptune was unsuccessful.
This dialectic will present the opposing arguments whether or not U.S. paratroop operations in during Operation Overlord were successful. A dialectic report is a review of a thesis and antithesis, followed by an evaluation of each argument to synthesize the information and determine a conclusion. The thesis for this argument comes from current paratrooper Dan Huff who argues that paratroopers were an effective use of manpower during the Second World War. The antithesis comes from Marc Devore, and he argues that paratroopers were not an effective use of manpower in WWII. By presenting clear evidence for each side of this argument, this paper will analyze and offer a concise conclusion regarding the use of airborne forces during the Second World War.
Warriors From the Sky
U.S. Army Major Dan Huff, in his Master’s Thesis for the Advanced Military Studies Program, describes the airborne component to Operation Overlord as being successful. Huff is an expert on the operational art of planning and a practiced paratrooper.
Titled, “Warriors from the Sky: US Army Airborne Operational Art in Normandy,” Huff contends that the reason the airborne component of the operations was successful is that they “were able to provide an essential disruption effect and seize key terrain to prevent German reinforcements from contesting the beachhead landings.” Huff posits that the airborne portion of the operation was successful because of the airborne forces to achieve surprise, seize key terrain, and disrupt enemy forces decision-making.
Huff’s first point is that the airborne forces managed to achieve surprise at both the tactical and operational levels. He credits the planning of the operation as the primary reason for this, and that surprise was “the most critical component of the airborne operation.”[4] Furthermore, Huff states that “The effect of achieving surprise forced the enemy into a reactive nature, taking the initiative away and creating confusion on the battlefield.” and that the airborne’s surprise directly led to German Panzer units being unable to defend the beach. According to Huff, “Essentially, entire panzer element waited idly as the airborne forces achieved their objectives.”
Secondly, Huff outlines the ability of the airborne units to capture their objectives with small, ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers.’ “The 101st quickly seized the towns of Poupeville and Ste-Martin-de-Varreville just south of Utah Beach. Therefore, although initial assault objectives were quickly seized, they were often accomplished by platoon-sized elements or smaller.” Furthermore, according to Huff, the 82nd while contending with stiff resistance managed to deny German forces access to the beachheads. “The 82nd moved to secure the crossing points over the Meredret River, specifically at La Fiere Bridge and the crossing point at Chef-du-Pont. Although the German forces were denied access to the beachheads, the crossing points were contested for several days.”
Finally, according to Huff, “the uncertainty created through a limited visibility airborne assault led to stifled German initiative. German commanders were receiving reports from almost everywhere on the battlefield. Often, reports directly contradicted each other, and the ensuing confusion led to German leadership paralysis.” Huff also describes the effect the initial wave of pathfinders had on German decision-making abilities, “the confusion on the battlefield led to inaccurate reporting and paralysis in decision-making.”
When Failure Thrives
Marc Devore’s study, When Failure Thrives, provides an analysis of airborne operations throughout the war by all belligerents. Devore, a political scientist at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, posits that airborne forces in the Second World War were ineffective and continued to have a place in the modern military because of their ability to institutionalize themselves as a part of the larger organization and not because of a stellar combat record. He continues by analyzing why three nations maintained their specific airborne force structure after the war based upon WWII results. For this paper, his argument concerning airborne operations during Operation Neptune will be the focus.
According to Devore, most airborne operations in WWII failed to accomplish their objectives and resulted in unacceptably high casualty rates. Devore posits that while the United States conducted thirteen airborne operations during World War II with less than half being deemed a success. He classifies Operation Neptune as indecisive, a ‘Pyhrric’ victory if anything. The reasons for the lack of success for the American airborne portion of Operation Neptune, according to Devore are vulnerable transport aircraft, high casualty rates, and an inability to complete assigned objectives on time.
First, Devore argues that “because of the need to deploy by air, paratroops traveled to their targets in large formations of vulnerable transport aircraft that could easily be destroyed by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft guns.”Vulnerable aircraft attempting to avoid anti-aircraft fire contributed to the high dispersal rate amongst paratroopers in Normandy.
Secondly, according to Devore, Allied airborne forces suffered unacceptably high casualty rates in Normandy, “Nineteen percent losses on the first day of operations,” as he tells us. The casualty rates suffered by American paratroopers at Normandy, according to Devore, led to their subsequent dismissal from plans such as the invasion of mainland Japan. He argues that this is the case despite the well thought out thorough planning that went into Neptune. One of the reasons for the high casualty rates suffered by paratroopers, according to Devore, is that they were lightly armed and poorly equipped to fight enemy armored units.
Finally, Devore argues that while larger forces were employed during Operation Neptune than ever before, their objectives were easier to achieve than in previous missions. As Devore puts it, “When Anglo-American paratroops jumped into battle during the 1944 invasion of Normandy, larger forces were employed to seize objectives that were kept deliberately modest.” Even with these modest objectives, American forces were scattered all over the Norman countryside. Devore describes the failure of American forces to assemble as a critical factor in the lack of success on D-Day, “With over 60 percent of their personnel dispersed, American airborne forces failed to take most of their objectives.”
Huff and Devore’s arguments are supported by clear scholarly analysis of the use of airborne forces during Operation Neptune. They both use a combination of primary and secondary source documents to arrive at their thesis and write coherently. While Huff concentrates on the effects of paratroopers during Neptune itself, he shapes his argument to also detail the operational art employed by its commanders in the context of modern day operational planning. Devore’s paper outlines further implications on the use of airborne operations by studying how three major powers performed during World War II, how they institutionalized their forces and why they have maintained their current airborne force structure today.
Huff’s initial argument that airborne forces managed to achieve surprise is only partially correct. While their exact drop locations were not immediately apparent to German defenders, reports of Germans flooding fields and emplacing obstacles to prevent paratrooper and glider landings show that they were expected. Furthermore, the amount of anti-aircraft fire experienced by the air armada also shows that by the time they exited the aircraft, surprise was not possible. While Huff argues that the element of surprise resulted in disruption effects, in actuality the disruption occurred due to their inability to achieve surprise and the German defenders forcing so many transports off course and to deposit their paratroopers early.
Huff is incorrect in asserting that airborne forces completed their assigned objectives on time. However, while arguing that the airborne forces seized their key objectives, he relents that such vital objectives as St. Come du Mont the La Fiere bridge were not secured in the time and manner as planned. This is likely due to the high dispersal and high casualty rates as both American airborne divisions could only account for approximately thirty-four percent of their men by the end of D-Day.
Huff’s final point about the chaos created by paratroopers has merit. Perhaps the best account of the paratrooper’s effectiveness comes from captured German Lieutenant Colonel Gunther Kiel, who complained: “each time we tried to assemble behind Utah Beach on D-Day, we were disrupted by bands of American Paratroopers.” However, the “Little Groups of Paratroopers” (LGOPs) that formed as a result of the scattered drop were not planned, should not be planned for, and are therefore not useful in assessing the feasibility of airborne operations going forward. However, the effect achieved by the LGOPs is a necessary component to the overall success of Operation Overlord.
Devore’s position on the vulnerability of transport aircraft directly led to his second point. Enemy anti-aircraft fire directly contributed to casualties itself. The ground-fire also forced the transports to take evasive action, which caused high dispersal rates and prevented paratroopers from massing on the ground. It follows that small groups of men are easier for German defenders to deal with and this would naturally cause more casualties.
Devore’s second point about high casualty rates is substantial. The point about aircraft vulnerability also contributed to high casualty rates. Of the two American divisions that landed- the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101stAirborne Division, consisting of 13,056 paratroops aboard 1,086 airplanes. By the end of D-Day, the 82nd Airborne Division could only account for approximately 2,000 of its men and had suffered 1,259 casualties. The 101st Airborne Division fared only marginally better, being able to account for about 2,500 of its men and suffering 1,240 casualties in addition to losing 60% of its equipment. By the end of their 33 days of front-line combat, the two airborne divisions combined for 9,915 total casualties out of almost 25,000 men, a 40% casualty rate, very similar to the casualty rate on Crete that forced the Germans to give up airborne operations.
Devore’s third point concerning the assignment of more modest objectives was a conclusion arrived at following earlier failures during operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy beforehand. His conclusion is based upon evidence from primary sources and the logic checks out as vulnerable aircraft led to high dispersal on the ground, which contributed to high casualties but this also logically contributes to an inability to complete assigned objectives within the assigned timeframe. Aircraft evasive maneuvers contributed to over 60 percent of the paratroopers missing their assigned drop zones, and therefore, failed to take some of their initial objectives. Furthermore, despite their ability to disrupt German defenders as Huff contends, a unit unable to complete its objectives is an ineffective unit.
If judged purely on casualties, Operation Neptune appears to be a failure. However, to ultimately adjudicate the effectiveness of paratroopers on D-Day, an examination of the two American beach landings must be made. At Utah Beach, behind which American paratroopers secured objectives and otherwise prevented German reinforcements from reaching the beach, U.S. VII Corps forces suffered 197 casualties. VII Corps met minimal resistance and landed 23,000 troops and 1,800 vehicles by the end of June 6. At Omaha Beach, no paratroopers dropped behind the beachhead where the U.S. V Corps landed, and by the end of June 6, the V Corps had only advanced one mile inland and had suffered 2,374 total casualties. Naturally, this does not reflect the differences in prepared defenses at either beach, but suffice to say that paratroopers landing behind Utah made a difference and likely could have done the same if dropped behind Omaha but the casualties suffered there may not have been enough to justify their use.
Conclusion
The use of airborne troops to spearhead the invasion of mainland Europe has become a legend within the modern U.S. Army. A debate surrounding the effectiveness of paratroopers on the battlefield will continue to persist. This debate is an integral part of the airborne mystique and the future employment of vertical envelopment. Just as the experience at Normandy informed airborne ops later in the war, the experience of airborne operations before Normandy, such as in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy directly informed their use in Northern France.
While airborne forces did not complete all assigned objectives on time, they did in fact disrupt the German defenders’ decision-making process. The use of paratroopers in Operation Overlord was likely a difficult decision by the commanders but ultimately made an impact on the outcome of the operation. In addition, despite high casualties, the men performing the operation understood the reality of their mission and were fully aware of the dangers of jumping out of an airplane while in flight; in fact, they were all volunteers who welcomed the challenge. Therefore, despite a contentious record, the elan and fighting spirit of the paratroopers carried them through thirty-three tough days of fighting in Normandy and despite the problems experienced in the operation, paratroopers made a significant impact on the battlefield at Normandy.
