Matthew Moten, ed., Between War and Peace: How American Ends its Wars (New York: Free Press, 2011)
Overview: This book examines how America’s major conflicts have ended. This is a volume of essays covering every major US war that focuses on how the last campaigns and decisions of the war affected the achievement of the war’s aims. It also looks at the changes to those aims that occurred during the war. Between War and Peace is a project of TRADOC, the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, and was commissioned by then-TRADOC Chief General Martin E. Dempsey
Central Thesis: The events that bring wars to an end are hardly what they seem at first.
Scope of Book: “In every war the aims of all sides, no matter how opposed at the beginning, gradually converge toward an agreement to stop fighting.” One pervasive theme is the frequency with which American troops have undertaken occupation duties, including governance. A second theme is the American Army’s curious reluctance to develop doctrine for irregular warfare. A third theme is the superiority of professional to amateur (in the time period of the book, mainly militia) soldiers and the gradual progress of the American Army from a barely unified group of militias under Washington to a fully professional, cohesive force. A terminal campaign may exercise an influence over the outcome of a war neither side intends, not does it derive from military action alone. A terminal campaign is strategically important; it plays a role in educating both sides about how much — or how little — their efforts can accomplish.
Roger Spiller’s Six Propositions: Spiller argues that war termination is a fleeting topic and one will search in vain for any definition of victory in American military doctrine. Spiller argues that our wars have had more equivocal outcomes than most people realize. The intro essay lays out 6 principles that the essays are meant to illustrate.
- Wars are defined by their limitations, with “absolute” and “total” war and “total” victory “theoretical abstractions”;
- Their original aims are constantly revised;
- The aims of all sides “gradually converge toward an agreement to stop fighting”;
- This convergence is not only the result of what happens on the battlefield;
- The conduct of war is increasingly public; and
- Rather than looking at “decisive” battles, we should look at “terminal” battles, those which influence how a war ends.
Yorktown: Yorktown allowed the US to achieve its war aims because of the decisive support of the French forces and loans. But it had to give up its most ardent republicanisms to do so, especially after the war. (40).
War of 1812: The War of 1812, says Wayne Lee, helped “cement the myth of American exceptionalism and . . . an imagined virtuous invincibility.” (62) He argues the battle of Plattsburgh was decisive to the war of 1812.
Second Seminole War: The war failed to produce an enduring piece and was ultimately a regrettable self-defeating affair, though it did provide some lessons for future wars as Sherman observed while most American officers were fixated on the threat of a European style invasion. (82-83)
The US War with Mexico: When Joseph Dawson discusses General Winfield Scott’s administration of a prostrate Mexico in the fall of 1847, he mentions “the truism that there are seldom enough troops available during postwar occupations” and describes, without editorializing, Scott’s sensible and thorough efforts to keep order. The war confirmed the that most officers wanted to focus on conventional war and failed to convince leaders that military governments made sense to establish after wars. (105)
The Civil War: Joseph Glatthaar writes that the ACW transformed the U.S. Army “from a stumbling, inefficient, and ill-disciplined volunteer force into a progressive, sophisticated, efficient war-making machine.” (127) He also argues that “Southern whites lost the [Civil] war but won much of the peace.” The Civil War, for Glatthaar shifted the Army toward professional development like never before. The war, for Glatthaar, turned on the elevation of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan to high levels of command and their subsequent aggressive raiding strategies permeating Union operations.
The 300-Years War: Peter Maslowski rebrands the Indian Wars as the “300-Years War” This war inspired no systematic study of guerrilla warfare as Native Americans were simply viewed as a transient nuisance and this sort of war was devoid of glorious titanic battles that decided the fate of nations.
Philippines: Brian McAllister Linn suggestively describes American commanders in the Philippine War of 1898–1902 as “focusing on winning the battle and ignoring the consequences. Fixated on tactics and operations they gave little thought to how this might achieve the nation’s strategic objectives.” And until recently, the US Army essentially ignored all lessons from the Philippines with little historiographical agreement. (176-177)
World War I: American infantry in the Meuse-Argonne offensive played a decisive role in ending the fighting, but the subsequent weak armistice did little to prevent the next, bloodier world war.
World War II ETO: Theodore Wilson sees the Cold War as an extension of World War II, with peace not really breaking out for generations.
World War II PTO: The atomic bombs played a decisive role in ending the war and allowing the US to achieve its war aims.
Korea: Eisenhower was convinced that nuclear threats were the main reasons for the armistice agreement, which fueled the New Look. (257)
Vietnam: “The Vietnam war is the only unmitigated failure in American military history.” (260) The war hinged on the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the US failed to terminate the war as quickly as possible there. Good tactics could not rescue failed strategy and policy. (278)
Cold War: The Soviet Union collapsed, and the US achieved its essential war aims precisely as they had been formulated— “a success as complete as any in the history of warfare.” (300)
Iraq I and II: Bacevich sums up the problem: “The Anglo-American invasion of 2003 transformed Iraq from a crumbling dictatorship into a failed state.” Bacevich argues that two false assumptions have governed American policy in the Persian Gulf. The first is that stability consists in “fostering a balance of power congenial to the United States.” But the U.S. has tried to manage that balance, and to change the nature of Gulf states. Still, it has always assumed that the Middle East, like other parts of the world, “consists of a more or less fixed number of legitimate states governed by more or less legitimate governments.” The second assumption is that American activism reduces conflict and advances American interests. “Bluntly, the phrase balance of power was a code word for hegemony.”
Commentary: A veritable who’s who of military historians of note in the 21st century. The common theme is war termination, but lots of the chapters deal more with war’s aftermath than its termination. Nevertheless, an excellent edited volume with thorough chapters describing the end of America’s major wars. Could be titled “America’s Last Battles” as well. Even though the last battle isn’t necessarily what ends the war.