The development of three-dimensional combined arms.
From the beginning of the war in 1914 through the armistice of 1918, the concept of air power developed from an ad hoc adventure into a formidable component of military strategy and combined arms warfare. Despite inconclusive short-term battlefield effects, military aviation forced commanders to account for it at all times because of the advances in tactics, techniques, and equipment. Therefore, military aviation did not make a significant impact on the outcome of the First World War, but rather the war made a significant impact on military aviation.
In the First World War, military aviation grew from an observation tool to a key component of combined arms planning. No operation after the middle of 1917 occurred without planning for its use. Either in defending against it or using it to support ground operations, aviation became a noteworthy component of combined arms warfare in the First World War. In addition, while the impact of airpower on the First World War is difficult to determine by standard measures of casualties or targets destroyed, there is no mistaking that the war itself was instrumental in pushing the envelope of military development. In order to demonstrate the effect that the war played in the development of military aviation, it is necessary to explore the developments of four major military aviation missions: reconnaissance, ground attack, strategic bombing, and air superiority.
Reconnaissance and observation are one of the earliest conceived missions for military aviation. The First World War forced commanders to improve upon that mission and eventually led to purpose-built airplanes specifically created for this purpose, which in turn led to better air-ground integration and affected other missions, such as a ground attack, that necessitated the seamless integration of air and ground assets. The advent of aerial photography contributed greatly to the concept of reconnaissance during the war. Initially relying on memory and quick sketches, pilots mounted cameras to aircraft, and photographs of the battlefield gave commanders a better assessment of the terrain.
The great powers continued to develop better techniques and equipment for conducting reconnaissance. Another critical innovation, two-way wireless communication, allowed pilots to communicate what they saw in real-time to ground commanders. In addition, 1915 saw the development of a new type of aircraft: the Infantry Contact Control Plane. This new tactical reconnaissance airplane conducted air support “along the cutting edge of the battle” primarily serving as a communications platform, especially when enemy artillery bombardment severed other lines of communication. In this regard, the conditions of the war helped necessitate the development of purpose-built aircraft for more efficient reconnaissance and therefore the war itself significantly influenced the development of reconnaissance aircraft.
As air-to-ground integration improved, so too did the ability of pilots to affect the ground battle. While still primitive by the end of the war, the First World War was the test bed that proved attacking ground targets to support army offensives was feasible. World War I is the cauldron in which such strategic ideas as Air Land Battle and Blitzkrieg first came to fruition. Ground attack is also known as close air support and is a derivative of tactical air power. Ground attack is a sub-mission of Tactical Air Power. Defined as “tactical missions directly in support of friendly forces, on either the offensive or the defensive and is the most complex and dangerous tactic of tactical air power,” ground attack began in earnest with the First World War. Very rudimentary at first, by 1917 British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aircraft were supporting advancing infantry and roaming over the battlefield looking for targets of opportunity.
Later in the year at Cambrai, the RFC integrated with advancing armor to destroy German anti-tank defenses and allow the British Expeditionary Forces to secure victory, displaying the first integration between tanks and airplanes, thus changing maneuver doctrine forever. By 1918, flyers had become extremely adept at providing ground support by way of bombing and ground attack missions. Tactical air support evolved from ad hoc, limited assaults on targets of opportunity in 1914 to planned and organized operations against enemy positions. Planners built ground-support operations into plans of attack. In the last year of the war, the airplane represented in “one platform the ability both to maneuver and to deliver accurate fire on a target.” While its actual battlefield effects are inconclusive, ground attack aircraft had become an integral part of maneuver because the conditions of the First World War necessitated it. Once again, the war affected the development of aircraft.
The effects of the strategic bombing were extremely inconclusive by the end of the First World War, but arguably the most important theory emerged from it. Raids on London and Paris caused little damage, but instead captured the imagination of massive bombardments, causing mass hysteria. These ideas led to many interwar theorists positing new ways to end wars quickly, and thus the concept of strategic bombardment emerged. Viewed as a concept to avoid the bloody stalemate that claimed so many lives on the Western Front, theorists such as Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard envisioned vast armadas of bombers attacking enemy forces at their Clauswitzian ‘center of gravity’ before they were able to engage in combat. Strategic bombing would require an independent air force, as the theory advocated for winning the war independent of ground action. Therefore, the concept of strategic bombardment gave way to many nations creating independent air forces.
At the beginning of the war, the dirigible was the preferred platform for strategic bombardment, but the Zeppelin raids proved inconclusive, with many of the airships unable to find their targets. The successor to the airship was the large multi-engine bomber, but like the Zeppelin, it was also more hype than substance. Bombers’ daytime vulnerability led to their use primarily in nighttime attacks, which affected accuracy and therefore effectiveness. What made strategic bombing enticing, however, was the psychological effect it had on the population centers that came under attack. The concept of strategic air power is one of the primary theories that emerged from the First World War and another example of how the war significantly shaped military aviation concepts moving forward.
Perhaps the most important lesson of the First World War, and the best example of how the war shaped military aviation, is in the concept of air superiority. Air superiority is “the condition achieved when an air force has sufficient superiority over its adversaries that it can conduct air operations without prohibitive interference from its adversaries.” Also known as, ‘command of the air’, without it, none of the other mission sets have a chance of being even mildly successful. While attempting to affect battlefield conditions through tactical or even strategic air missions, those airplanes would routinely find themselves under attack by enemy aircraft. In response, great power air forces made organizational changes to mass air power over the battlefield in order to control the air and thus gain air superiority. Additionally, this necessitated many technological innovations that led to purpose-built fighter aircraft assigned to pursuit squadrons.
The first purpose-built fighter aircraft emerged in 1915, and almost immediately, aerial battle conditions changed. Fighting in 1916 at Verdun and the Somme taught air planners the necessity of air superiority. German success at Verdun was a direct result of achieving air superiority, after which the Germans denied the use of the air over the battlefield to the French and thus controlled the skies. At the Somme, Allied aircraft regained control by employing their own ‘synchronized forward-firing machine guns’ to achieve dominance of the skies in that battle.
The French counterattack on June 11, 1918, is an excellent example of the value of tactical air power. After quickly gaining air superiority, the French were able to turn the bulk of their air power to attacking German ground forces, which played a crucial role in the French victory. Amid the chaos of aerial combat, decisiveness was difficult to achieve. No single power achieved complete air superiority but did manage to achieve it over portions of the battlefield as required for specific battles. More importantly, the war itself drove innovation that led to purpose-built aircraft, a concept that would become an integral part of the future of military aviation.
By the end of the war, military aviation had become an integral part of the combined arms team. The war had necessitated it. Air superiority became a critical objective for commanders and was essential for shaping the battlefield for the successful conduct of ground combat. Artillery was the leading killer, but aviation directed its fires. Military aviation, while still primitive, played an instrumental role in the First World War that no major power could have conducted operations without. Without aviation, it is very likely that the war would be even more costly in terms of both troops and treasure.
Military aviation is thus a double-edged sword, while likely preventing friendly deaths; it gives nations the capability to bring even more death and destruction than ever before. Regardless, the development of reconnaissance, ground attack, strategic bombing, and air superiority was a byproduct of the First World War and these concepts would become integral parts of military aviation and national strategy. Therefore, the war played a significant role in guiding the future of military aviation.