Fear. Honor. Interest.
While multiple incidents drove the Spartans to declare war on Athens, the fear of Athenian power was undoubtedly not the driving force behind Sparta’s decision. A mighty Athens presented a clear and present danger to the economic and political sovereignty of the Peloponnesian League and required a response. Athens displayed strong empirical ambitions demonstrated by their disregard for Corinthian influence in Corcyra and Potidaea, and the economic decree levied against Megara. The eventual Spartan response was, therefore, the next evolution in Peloponnesian foreign policy toward tyrants. The Spartans did not act out of fear, but instead, after careful consideration of Athenian actions and attempting to solve the situation diplomatically, they made the logical decision to put an end to Athenian challenges of the Greek status quo.
In 433, it was Athens who assisted Corcyra in their dispute with Corinth, challenging the sanctity of Corinthian influence over their colony. While it is true that the Corcyraeans, who had always treated the Corinthians with disdain, went looking for help from the Athenians, Corinth viewed the Athenian assistance as an insult to their personal affairs. The Athenians, in a shrewd strategic move, entered into an alliance with the Corcyraeans that had the double effect of adding to their navy and giving them control over the sea routes between Helles and Sicily. The ensuing battle did little to ease tensions between the Peloponnesian League and Athens.
Immediately following the battle of Corcyra, the Athenians continued their attempt at controlling former Corinthian colonies. Potidaea, interestingly, was both a Corinthian colony and a tributary ally of Athens. The region around Potidaea is known as the Pallene and was rich in timber and tar for building ships and was very enticing for Athenian imperial eyes. In an attempt to establish dominance in the region, the Athenians order the Potidaeans to expel Corinthian magistrates, raze the wall on the Pallene side, give hostages and not receive future Corinthian magistrates. Caught between the two powers, Potidaea sends envoys to both Athens and Sparta for help. Ultimately the Corinthian’s incite a revolt by bringing both volunteers and mercenaries to fight and again engage the Athenians in a battle over a colony they founded. The Athenian behavior at Potidaea represents their empirical ambitions throughout the Aegean region. Not only was Athens trying to control more territory to receive more tributes from their allies, but they were also attempting to secure more resources that would continue their naval dominance in the region.
Further compounding the problem, in late 432, the Athenians sanctioned a trade embargo that would become known as the Megarian Decree. The Megarian Decree was the Athenian response to Megara (themselves a former Athenian ally) assisting Corinth at Corcyra, and as such, the Athenians continued to exert their dominance by punishing those who supported Corinth. Understanding that declaring war on Megara and Corinth would lead to a ground war against the elite Spartiates, the Athenians attempted to avoid military confrontation through economic sanctions. However, this would prove to be a gross underestimation of Spartan loyalty to the members of the Peloponnesian League. Sparta correctly surmised that this act was merely the latest example of Athenian desires to control the entire region.
The Spartans, in classic Spartan fashion, took their time in pondering the decision to declare war. The Spartans did ultimately vote to declare war, but only after attempting to solve the crisis through diplomatic means. According to Thucydides, “they [the Spartans] feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them.” The Spartans, however, do not make rash decisions, especially one made out of fear. The vote for war followed multiple aggressive actions by Athens including a refusal of Spartan demands that would have ensured peace. The Athenians were power hungry and bent on controlling the entire region, while the Spartans are merely responding to the threat of Athenian dominance and an end to their way of life. This response is not out of fear, but out of an innate need to defeat what they likely viewed as an impending tyrannical empire. The Spartans and their allies had grown tired of Athenian aggression and took appropriate action when all other measures failed.
