Is it unique or just another form of warfare?
Terrorism, while morally impermissible, is no more or less distinctive than many other acts of war. History is rife with many examples of tactics that directly kill non-combatants but would not be considered terrorism. Therefore, I disagree with philosopher Samuel Scheffler’s assertion that terrorism is morally distinctive from warfare. I do believe that while terrorism is morally impermissible, it is a tactic of warfare used by non-state actors. Terrorism functions on the same moral ground as other forms of warfare that are explicitly designed to kill non-combatants, generate fear, and use that fear to degrade or disrupt the social order of the enemies’ society in an attempt to force them to surrender on favorable terms. I believe that what makes terrorism morally distinctive is not that it targets non-combatants to generate fear, but rather that in its paradigm, it is perpetrated by non-state actors.
Contemplating the moral distinctiveness of terrorism requires that it first be defined. I believe Helen Frowe offers the best characterization of terrorism. Frowe outlines five common features that help determine whether an action is terrorism or not: These characteristic features are 1. It is politically motivated. 2. It is aimed at non-combatants. 3. It is perpetrated by non-state actors. 4. It is violent. 5. It is intended to generate fear. Through this framework, we can decide whether an action is terrorism or not. Many times groups of non-state actors will attack combatants, but I ascertain this is separate from terrorism and constitutes a form of guerrilla warfare that on its surface looks very similar to terrorist attacks.
In his article, Samuel Scheffler uses what he terms “standard cases” of terrorism to explore its moral distinctiveness. According to Scheffler, standard cases of terrorism, or paradigm, is as follows: “some people are killed or injured (the primary victims), to create fear in a larger number of people (the secondary victims), with the aim of destabilizing or degrading the existing social order for everyone.” Scheffler then continues by arguing that terrorism is morally distinctive because it violates Kant’s principle in two ways. First, by using humans merely as a means. Secondly, it treats people (the primary victims) as a mere means to another mere means (secondary victims) to an end. This second violation of Kant’s principle is a doubling down of sorts on the original principle that prohibits the use of people as a means. Scheffler argues that terrorists thus use people as a means to a means to an end. Additionally, Scheffler argues that the generation of fear is also what makes terrorism morally distinctive. Fear and the violation of Kant’s principle, while morally impermissible, do not necessarily separate terrorism from warfare.
By the definition of terrorism I expounded upon above, it is impossible for states to commit terrorism as this definition requires that for an act to be terrorism it is conducted by non-state actors. Scheffler addresses what he calls state perpetrated terror by stating that:
States can undoubtedly employ terrorist tactics in the manner in which I have described as a way of destabilizing societies. They can do this in wartime, through the use of such tactics as ‘terror bombing,’ or in peacetime through covert operations targeting another country’s civilian population.
To put this into further context, Scheffler also believes that the paradigm definition of terrorism renders it impossible for states to conduct terrorism, stating that the term is sometimes used to describe all forms of non-state actors committing political violence. However, terrorists can themselves be thought of as unjust combatants due to their actions. Furthermore, as evidenced by Scheffler’s quote above, terrorism is no more morally distinctive than terror bombing in that they seek to achieve the same use of people as a mere means to another mere means to an end.
There are many instances in warfare in the 20th Century in which a state targeted civilians of their opponent. Moreover, while this targeting of non-combatants is probably not morally permissible, it was nonetheless, at times, conducted by the just side of the war. For example, during World War II both sides of the war attacked non-combatants specifically. Also, in many cases, the expressed goal was to generate fear in the population to coerce the civilian population to pressure their government to surrender. This is very similar to Scheffler’s argument about standard cases of terrorism and, I argue, no different.
The concept of strategic bombardment is a specific strategy of air power initially raised by Italian theorist Giulio Douhet in 1921 that civilian population centers were crucial to achieving air dominance. His ideas were used extensively throughout World War II, as he proposed that civilian populations be directly targeted as part of the air campaign to affect the morale and will of the people. Douhet’s theory was therefore designed to disrupt their government and force them to acquiesce to the demands of the aggressor. Of course, throughout World War II, the inverse was true as the civilian population’s morale was strengthened rather than weakened.
Furthermore, the U.S. doctrine of achieving what is known as Rapid Dominance, better known as “Shock and Awe” also rests at least partially on the ability to create fear within an adversary’s society. As stated in their 1996 paper, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade state that “the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause the perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary’s society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction.” Generating fear is an essential element of warfare and not restricted to just terrorists. State militaries create fear amongst a population of non-combatants as a result of the deaths of non-combatants and see this as an essential part of the war effort.
Despite being used by states that believe their cause is just, both Douhet’s theory and the concept of Shock and Awe are eerily similar to Scheffler’s “standard cases” of terrorism. The only difference being who performs these acts. Of course, civilian casualties are necessarily acceptable when caused by war, as I believe that adding the doctrine of double intention to the doctrine of double effect is crucial in determining the moral permissibility of an action in war. In the cases outlined above, causing the death of non-combatants to illicit fear is the entire intent, and therefore their deaths are morally impermissible and unjust. In so doing, terror bombing and other strategies that are similar are on the same moral level as terrorism.
Terrorism is instead a tactic of war. Terrorists, in my opinion, are unjust combatants that fail to follow the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. According to the rules of jus ad bellum, terrorism is unjust for many reasons. While the cause may be just, killing non-combatants violates the condition of proportionality. Additionally, the terrorist group’s intention might be just, however, as non-state actors, they are not declaring war from a legitimate authority. Finally, many terrorist groups declare war on their enemies despite their illegitimate authority; they believe that they are acting in the last resort, nor that they have a reasonable chance of success.
Terrorists also do not follow the rules of jus in bello in a multitude of ways. First, by failing to use the proportionality and necessity conditions as well as targeting non-combatants indiscriminately and are thus merely unjust combatants. Secondly, terrorists violate the conditions of jus in bello by not identifying themselves as combatants, attacking illegitimate targets, not using legitimate tactics, nor affording prisoners of war the required provisions as outlined in the rules of jus in bello and the Geneva Convention. Terrorists are conceivably the most unjust of all combatants.
It is not the generation of fear within a populace that makes it morally distinctive as it is no more distinct than specific forms of warfare. I believe that the moral distinctiveness of terrorism comes from the fact that it is carried out by non-state actors. Scheffler’s standard cases for terrorism are conducted by non-state actors, and as such, they are committing acts of violence without legitimate authority. I agree with Frowe that legitimate authority requires a legitimate head of state or parliamentary body to declare war for that war to be just. Without a state, terrorists cannot have a just war and this combined with their unjust tactics make their entire enterprise morally impermissible but not distinctive. However, perhaps the inverse is true and legitimate authority should not be a necessary condition of jus ad bellum. If this is true, then terrorists are no more morally distinctive than any other unjust combatant, as this would still not be enough to make a terrorist a just combatant.
How terrorism is classified is essential to how terrorists will be treated when captured, and therefore the long term success of what the United States of America has declared the “war on terror.” If we classify terrorism as a subset of war, then terrorists must be afforded the rights of prisoners of war as outlined in the Geneva Convention whether they are considered just or unjust combatants. Furthermore, if terrorists are treated as prisoners of war they must be treated with dignity and respect, prohibiting degrading treatment. If, on the other hand, captured terrorists are treated without respect, we can expect that this treatment will only produce more terrorist enemies throughout the world. By treating terrorists as combatants, terrorism is not morally distinctive on the grounds that Scheffler attests.
