Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, Eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
Overview: An exploration of case studies in interwar innovation including armored warfare, amphibious warfare, strategic bombardment, close air support, carrier aviation, submarine warfare, and radar. These chapters are followed by three interpretive ones that explore the larger implications of innovation and its implications for the future.
Central Thesis: This study provides insights into the nature of the process involved in major innovation and change in military organizations during the interwar period and to highlight those factors that encourage success as well as those that inhibit innovation.
Scope of Book: The books essays explore these seven areas of innovation by exploring the problems involved in doctrinal, technological, and weapons innovation in a period of sever budget constraint and revolutionary technological change. Each essay explores their innovation by examining three concepts: the strategic framework of the period, the organizational factors of the institutions under study, and the doctrinal framework of the services. The book emphasizes the complexities inherent in innovation and assumes that innovation is the natural result of a dynamic environment in which organizations must change in order to survive.
Chapter 1: Armored Warfare: After WWI, the British, French, and Germans digested the lessons of armored warfare congruent with their organizational outlook. The British essentially ignored armored warfare focusing instead on sea and air power due to their island isolation and wish to stay out of continental wars. The French turned to methodical battle and robust defense, while the Germans pursued an improvement on the lessons they learned in the wars closing years, a belief in maneuver, an offensive mindset focused on breakthroughs, and further development of decentralized Auftragstaktik.
Chapter 2: Amphibious Warfare: The Japanese did not completely develop amphibious techniques and did not have a navy or army large enough for protracted war. They were further compounded by having both navy and army troops doing amphibious operations without centralized planning and training. The Americans had a potent independent service—USMC—that had a clear wartime mission after 1921 to seize advanced bases. The British, haunted by the disastrous Dardanelles operation, had no organizational foundation or funding source to complete the development of the doctrine.
Chapter 3: Strategic Bombing: The Germans, mainly because of their continental position in central Europe with enemies on both sides, focused development on medium range and close attack aircraft to support ground forces rather than strategic bombers—as a result they did not have the typical four-engine bomber required to conduct effective bombardment. The British and Americans, again reflecting their strategic and geographic reality, developed the technology necessary for long-range bombing—the Americans even more so because of the distances required to fly across the country and Atlantic. Both had a belief in the efficacy of the bomber fleets alone and disdained escort fighters. As the war began, the American Air Forces adapted the best, while the British concentrated on fighters to fight the Blitz.
Chapter 4: Close Air Support: The ability of the three major air powers to conduct CAS was limited until the last two years of WWII—except Germany. Germany developed early dominance in this arena but neglected it after the war raged. CAS reflected a threat to Air Forces institutional autonomy—returning it to a status as an auxiliary of the ground forces. As such, the Brits and Americans did little to develop this capability during the interwar period. Most of the improvement in this arena was resulted from personal contacts between ground and air commanders at junior ranks. The Germans encouraged this with their decentralized approach, but in the Allied forces this took some time.
Chapter 5: Aircraft Carrier: Aviation had a decisive effect on naval battles in WWII, the British, American, and Japanese navies, however, did not fully realize its potential during the interwar period. Primarily due to resources and the limitations of the Naval Treaty’s of the 20s and 30s which limited the tonnage of ships, as well as institutional culture that favored battleships. The British also suffered from dividing the responsibility between the RAF and RN.
Chapter 6: Submarines: Notes that submarines are often outside the purview of “civilized” war for their use in commerce raiding. In London, Berlin, and Washington funds usually went to traditional battle fleets. Each navy believed that unrestricted submarine warfare had failed in WWI, this led to reduced experimentation in new doctrine and innovation as even submarine enthusiasts saw their role as part of the main battle fleet.
Chapter 7: Radio to Radar: Germans developed radio for maneuver warfare. British for signals intelligence and radar for its own intelligence and defensive value. Americans slowly developed both during the interwar period and ratcheted up development as war broke out.
Chapter 8: Past and Future: Unlike other organizations, military forces in peacetime must innovate and prepare for a war 1) that will occur at some indeterminate point in the future, 2) against an opponent who may not yet be determined, 3) in political conditions which one cannot accurately predicts, and 4) in an arena of brutalist and violence which one cannot replicate. Also—military institutions exist in an culture of disciplined obedience. They then define revolutionary innovation: a phenomenon of top-down leadership. And evolutionary innovation: a long, complex process involving organizational cultures, strategic requirements, the international situation, and the capacity to learn realistic, honest lessons from past as well as present military experience—gradual change. The chapter then outlines factors for success or failure in innovation.
Chapter 9: Patterns: “Military innovation is a complex pattern of interactions between strategic assumptions, the technological state-of-the-art and future research and development, military organizational politics and operational doctrine, and civil-military interaction.” (367)
Chapter 10: Military Innovation in Peacetime: This chapter serves as a basis for the contemporary environment (mid-1990s) and helping military leaders think about innovating for the next war. Mainly they determine that innovation in peacetime is very nonlinear and that most innovation takes one to two decades to reach operational maturity.
Commentary: An enjoyable read. Murray and Millett are the masters of the edited volume, though they seem to have done most of the writing in this one. Nothing entirely new under the sun in this one, but an excellent summation of prevailing wisdom on interwar innovation. It would probably be an excellent book for the RMA question, as well as critical for the specific question on interwar innovation. An interesting quote from chapter 9: “Only reckless historians make absolute claims for specific periods of military innovation, usually labeled a “revolution” of some sort, technological or social. The “Military Revolution of the Sixteenth Century” now covers enough centuries to qualify as several revolutions.” (330)